美国现行货币政策的内容？

1. 美国现行货币政策的内容？

美国的货币制度 


（一）美国的中央银行 
美国联邦储备系统是美国的中央银行，成立于1913年12月23日，主要职责是保障美国货币和金融体系的安全、灵活和稳定。 

《美国联邦储备法》规定，成员银行需向联邦储备银行缴纳相当于其资本和盈余总和的6％数量的资本。联邦储备银行则被要求每年向其成员银行支付其缴入资本的6％的红利，通常每年分两次支付。截止2006年12月31日，联邦储备银行的注册资本为135.36亿美元，占其总资本的51.2％。 

根据1913年的《联邦储备法》规定，美国在12个主要城市设立储备银行，成为联储体系的组成部分。这12家地区储备银行的职责包括为其成员银行进行支票交换、回收损毁货币并发放新币、对合并申请进行评估、向该区的成员银行投放贴现贷款、审查属于联邦储备成员的州立银行、就地方银行和经济状况提出分析和报告，以及进行一般的银行与经济研究并出版部分刊物。 联邦储备理事会是联邦储备系统中的重要组成部分。理事会由七位理事组成。他们均由美国总统任命并经参议院确认，任期14年。联邦储备理事会办公地点设在华盛顿，通常每周会晤若干次商讨与货币政策和银行监管有关的问题。    

（二）美元 
美元硬币由美国财政部发行，币值有1美分、5美分、10美分、25美分、50美分和1美元六种；美元纸币由美国联邦储备系统发行，面额为1美元、2美元、5美元、10美元、20美元、50美元和100美元七种。    

二、美国的货币政策    
（一）货币政策目标 
  根据《美国联邦储备法》，美国的货币政策目标是控制通货膨胀，促进充分就业。目前，美联储货币政策的操作目标是联邦基金利率。 
美国联邦基金利率是指美国同业拆借市场的利率，其最主要的是隔夜拆借利率。这种利率的变动能够敏感地反映银行之间资金的余缺，美联储瞄准并调节同业拆借利率就能直接影响商业银行的资金成本，并且将同业拆借市场的资金余缺传递给工商企业，进而影响消费、投资和国民经济。    

（二）美国货币政策的决定 
  联邦公开市场委员会是美联储系统中最重要的货币政策制定部门。其由7位联邦储备理事会成员以及5位地区储备银行行长组成，其中纽约联邦储备银行行长为固定成员。一般来说，联邦储备理事会主席任联邦公开市场委员会主席，纽约联邦储备银行行长任副主席。委员会通常每五到八星期在华盛顿会晤一次，对具体货币政策操作进行投票。联邦公开市场委员会的政策指令及会议概要于会后六周对外公开。

（三）美国货币政策的实施 
美国联邦储备系统执行货币政策的主要工具包括公开市场操作、贴现率和法定存款准备金率。    

公开市场业务 
  联邦储备系统的公开市场业务包括买入和卖出证券（通常为政府债券(TB)、资产支持证券(ABS)和按揭抵押证券(MBS)）。这些业务工具是联邦储备系统所使用的最基本最主要的政策工具，用以改变经济中货币与信贷的成本和可得性。联邦储备系统通过购买证券增加银行系统的准备金，使银行能够扩大其贷款与投资；通过卖出证券从银行系统抽出准备金，从而削减银行进行贷款和投资的能力。    

贴现贷款 
贴现贷款是美联储向商业银行、存款类机构的贷款。商业银行和存款类机构向联储借款时，联储所收取的利息率称为贴现率。联储通过调整贴现率，可以影响银行体系准备金的水平，继而影响联邦基金利率的水平。   

 法定存款准备金 
调整法定存款准备金是一个非常直接有力的货币政策工具。通过调整法定存款准备金，联储向银行系统注入或抽取流动性，直接影响货币总量。

2. 对美国货币政策几个最常见的误读

从国家利益出发，协调中美货币政策，需要超越货币政策，全面审视美国货币政策影响中国经济全过程;需要超越对GDP的崇拜，从国家财富增长目标出发，促进出口适度增长和出口结构调整。100年前美国货币政策已经开始影响中国经济，2010年美国多方利益集团在人民币汇率问题上向中国施以巨大压力。2015年美元强势回归，大批资金撤出中国。如何应对美国货币政策?这是摆在中国政府面前一个大问题。
　　美国货币政策不仅曾经影响了中国经济，而且深刻地影响了中国政治。美国货币政策对中国产生重大影响的历史分三个阶段：第一阶段是1910年前后。“一场全球金融危机引发中国上海股市崩盘。而由于中国股市中特有的官商勾结、官场争斗、制度糜烂等诸多要素，这场单纯的市场危机不但危害程度被无限放大，而且迅速转化为政治危机――违规入市且损失惨重的川汉铁路陷入资金困境，并且就损失款的补偿问题与中央持续发生矛盾，引爆了‘保路运动’，成为辛亥革命的先声。”第二阶段是20世纪30年代前期。“由于美国实行白银政策，人为地抬高银价，使世界银价大大高于中国国内银价。如果从中国装运白银到伦敦或纽约市场出售，所获的利润非常可观。国内白银纷纷外流，冲击了当时中国货币制度――银本位制，而且对中国的社会经济造成了极坏的影响”[3]，并直接导致中国银本位制的崩溃。第三阶段是20世纪末和21世纪初期。吴丽丽认为，在20世纪末和21世纪初期，美国货币政策通过影响国际大宗商品价格使中国出口高速增长，PPI持续走高，最终造成中国财富流失。
　　从国际贸易、资本流动、汇率、利率和流动性等角度分析，美国货币政策使中国贸易顺差增长、人民币兑美元汇率升值、投机趋利性资金流入、外汇储备和基础货币投放上升、通胀压力增大。美国货币政策冲击对中国汇率及名义利率均没有显著影响，却对境内外人民币汇差和中外利差影响显著。张曙光测度了中国的外商直接投资函数和进出口函数及其汇率弹性，认为人民币汇率升值会引起出口贸易数量减少，但在几个季度以后，升值的影响近于消失，认为长期内人民币升值不会影响中国对外贸易状况。李增来和梁东黎运用结构向量自回归模型，研究美国货币政策冲击对中国进口、出口、净出口和总产出的动态影响。其贡献在于利用方差分解，将政策冲击分解为长短期两个方面，不过未考虑影响机制，也未考虑汇率、利率在其中的影响作用。

3. 美国货币政策的介绍

美国的货币政策的制定和执行职责，长期以来由美国的中央银行即美国联邦储备委员会（简称美联储，FRS）承担。货币政策是美国调控国民经济和社会发展的主要宏观政策工具。美国法律规定，货币政策的目标是实现充分就业并保持市值的稳定，创造一个相对稳定的金融环境。在货币政策执行过程中，美联储积极运用有关金融工具以尽量减少利率和货币信贷量的变化，努力达到兼顾 “充分就业、市值稳定”的两大目标的目的。随着市场经济的成熟和发展，美联储货币政策在宏观调控经济方面发挥了日益重要的作用。

4. 美国货币政策的美国货币政策大事记

1942年  美国参加第二次世界大战。FED应财政部的要求正式承担保持国债低利率的义务。财政部需要低成本的资金来为战争筹款。FED因此不得不放弃货币存量的目标，专注于控制利率。  1950年  朝鲜战争爆发。财政部希望FED继续承担保持低利率的责任，而FED更希望控制战争带来的通货膨胀压力，双方发生矛盾。  1951年3月4日  FED和财政部签署《财政部和联邦储备系统协议》（the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord），该协议终结了FED支持美国国债价格的义务，确保了联储制定和执行货币政策的独立性。在该协议之前，美国没有独立的货币政策，货币政策只是财政政策的附庸。  1958年11月  .W.Phillips发表《The Relation Between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdoms,1861-1957》（Economica, November 1958, pp. 283-299）。它的直接含义就是通货膨胀与失业率之间存在替代关系，这篇文章的发表标志着Phillips Curve曲线的发现。  1975年  美国开始试验货币增长量目标制（Money-Growth Targeting）。FED宣布对三个主要的货币总量：M1、M2、M3的目标增长范围。由于实际上FED在存款方面能够控制的，只是基础货币，所以要想同时达到这三个不同的货币总量目标，实际上是不现实的。事实上，FED经常达不到它事先宣布的目标，经常有很大的误差。货币主义者声称，FED同时宣布三个不同的货币总量目标，表明它对于实行固定的货币增长规则并非十分严肃。  1979年8月  保罗·沃尔克就任FED主席。两个月后，他说服联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）的同僚们赞同削减通货膨胀，使他们相信联储的运作程序需要根本性的变化。1978年的通货膨胀率为9%，1979年为12%。通货膨胀率的激增，使得FED下定决心对付通货膨胀问题。  1979年10月  FED宣布，它致力于货币供应的缓慢增长，将乐于默认更大更频繁的短期利率变动。这标志着FED操作程序的重大改变，FED将货币政策的中介目标集中到M2上，而放弃了短期利率。在这之后，利率迅速上升，而经济低迷。卡特政府对这一做法并没有表示反对。  1980年3月  短期利率超过15%，联储失去了卡特政府的支持。因为距离总统大选不到9个月了，卡特总统授权联储对信贷实行强行管制，并连续利用电视媒体有力地劝诫消费者抑制信贷的使用。在接下来的三个月里，经济明显地衰退了。FED将短期利率几乎削减了一半，以应对货币存量的下降。这个措施更像是为了在大选年扭转衰退的尝试，而不是联储瞄准货币总量的新政策的利率后果。利率降低以后，经济有所复苏。非常短期的紧缩货币政策和微弱的经济复苏，不足以降低通货膨胀率。  80年代初期  在实践货币增长目标制的期间，美国、德国、英国、加拿大的通货膨胀率确实都显著下降，但是它们的产出和失业率也变得很不稳定，失业率都显著上升。  1982年  由于无法接受失业率上升，FED宣布不再特别强调实行货币增长目标制（Money-growth targeting），转而更重视利率目标制（Interest Rate Targeting）。  1993年  FED宣布彻底废止使用货币增长目标制。在此之前的80年代，其他实行货币增长目标制的国家也已经纷纷不再实行（德国和瑞士除外，不过德国也在 1987年宣布将货币增长的目标从中央银行货币转为M3）。FED解释的原因是70年代和80年代，货币需求频繁变动，十分不稳定。这时，如果依然保持货币供给不变，就会造成利率的剧烈变动，这对经济是很不利的。

5. 美国货币宽松政策

6. 美国当前的货币政策是什么

量化宽松货币政策(quantitative easing monetary policy)
主要是指中央银行在实行零利率或近似零利率政策后，通过购买国债等中长期债券，增加基础货币供给，向市场注入大量流动性资金的干预方式，以鼓励开支和借贷。一般来说，只有在利率等常规工具不再有效的情况下，货币当局才会采取这种极端做法。量化指的是扩大一定数量的货币发行，宽松就是减少银行储备必须注资的压力。
所谓“量化宽松”，或称定量宽松，是指由央行提高银行准备金。事实上所有的央行量化宽松都涉及到资产购买——主要是回购政府债券，以及出售这些资产给央行的银行准备金账户。央行调控经济的常用工具是通过利率，以及创造储备以降低短期信贷市场的利率，特别是储备市场，也被称为联邦基金市场。但是，截至2008年12月，美联储已经创造了足够的储备来推动联邦基金利率下降到零的水平，这是联邦基金利率所能达到的最低水平。一旦到达这一水平后，如果想进一步宽松政策，美联储唯一的途径就是增加储备，而这对短期利率并不能产生进一步的影响。因此，量化宽松政策是指央行在短期利率处于或接近零时增加储备的政策。

7. 美国的货币政策？

美国的货币政策的制定和执行职责，长期以来由美国的中央银行即美国联邦储备委员会（简称美联储，FRS）承担。货币政策是美国调控国民经济和社会发展的主要宏观政策工具。美国法律规定，货币政策的目标是实现充分就业并保持市值的稳定，创造一个相对稳定的金融环境。在货币政策执行过程中，美联储积极运用有关金融工具以尽量减少利率和货币信贷量的变化，努力达到兼顾 “充分就业、市值稳定”的两大目标的目的。随着市场经济的成熟和发展，美联储货币政策在宏观调控经济方面发挥了日益重要的作用。
美联储出台二次量化宽松政策后，又下调了对未来两年的经济预测，表明美国的货币政策在明年之后仍会继续保持宽松。预计零利率政策将持续更长时间，这也加大了全球范围内南北之间在经济以及货币政策层面的对立和关系紧张。北方经济疲弱与南方经济过热倾向并存。新兴市场经济体需求旺盛对国际大宗商品价格形成了强力支撑，居高不下的商品价格反过来一方面造成新兴市场输入通胀压力的加大，另一方面也给西方经济复苏设置了障碍。通常投入品价格的上升会最终传导到工资收入的上升并给私人消费提供支持，但受私人部门减债压力拖累，西方主要经济体就业市场仍可能持续疲弱，工资下行压力仍然很大。因而，未来一段时间全球通胀压力加大，但恶性通胀的可能性不大。 所谓量化宽松货币政策，实际上是加快印钞机的运转来刺激经济活动的土办法，是彻头彻尾的通胀刺激措施。在相当程度上，美国的量化宽松货币政策，也是一种投机性的货币政策。美国量化宽松政策直接的目的在于刺激美国的经济复苏，对美国经济能够直接从中获得多少活力，恐怕连伯南克自己也没有底，但它无疑会对其他新兴经济体造成相当大的不利冲击。在现行国际货币体系下，美元的近零利率与无节制开动美元印钞的做法无疑会导致全球美元泛滥，要么造成新兴国家本币升值的压力，要么是通胀与资产价格泡沫，也就是说，美国实际上是利用美元货币强权转退通胀的办法来刺激其国内经济的复苏，因而是投机性的货币政策。上世纪90年代中期，日本经济泡沫破灭后急剧地降低了日元利率，结果导致日元套利交易的兴起，并刺激了东南亚国家的房地产泡沫，结果酿成了后来的亚洲金融危机。现在美国及发达国家的低利率正在推动新兴经济体新的资产泡沫，这对未来全球经济是非常危险的。就此而论，美国口口声声要求中国承担大国的责任，起码它本身在货币政策操作上就是对全球未来宏观经济的稳定极不负责。

8. 美国货币政策的美国货币政策的目标

Judd, Rudebusch下面是一封旧金山联邦储备银行的经济学通信。里面谈到了美国的货币政策目标及其历史演变。1913年，美联储成立的时候，没有规定目标，只说它的作用是维持货币弹性。1946年《就业法》规定美联储的货币政策目标是促进最大就业。1977年和1978年的《全面就业和预算平衡法》规定，货币政策有三个：“完全就业，价格稳定，中长期利率平稳”。现在，正在争论是否将货币政策目标只减为保持价格稳定这一项。欧洲央行已经这样做了。  ================[/title5]FRBSF Economic Letter99-04; January 29, 1999The Goals of U.S. Monetary Policy* The evolution of the Fed's legislative mandate   * The debate about the Fed's current mandate   * ReferencesThe Federal Reserve has seen its legislative mandate for monetary policy change several times since its founding in 1913, when macroeconomic policy as such was not clearly understood. The most recent revisions were in 1977 and 1978, and they require the Fed to promote both price stability and full employment. The past changes in the mandate appear to reflect both economic events in the U.S. and advances in understanding how the economy functions. In the twenty years since the Fed's mandate was last changed, there have been further important economic developments as well as refinements in economic thought, and these raise the issue of whether to modify the goals for U.S. monetary policy once again. Indeed, a number of other countries--notably those that adopted the Euro as a common curency at the start of this year--have accepted price stability as the new primary goal for their monetary policies.In this Letter, we spell out the evolution of the legislation governing U.S. monetary policy goals and summarize the debate about whether they could be improved.The evolution of the Fed's legislative mandateThe Federal Reserve Act of 1913 did not incorporate any macroeconomic goals for monetary policy, but instead required the Fed to provide an elastic currency. This meant that the Fed should help the economy avoid the financial panics and bank runs that plagued the 19th century by serving as a lender of last resort, which involved making loans directly to depository institutions through the discount windows of the Reserve Banks. During this early period, most of the actions of monetary policy that affected the macro economy were determined by the U.S. government's adherence to the gold standard.The trauma of the Great Depression, coupled with the insights of Keynes (1936), led to an acknowledgment of the obligation of the federal government to prevent recessions. The Employment Act of 1946 was the first legislative statement of these macroeconomic policy goals. Although it did not specifically mention the Federal Reserve, it required the federal government in general to foster conditions under which there will be afforded useful employment opportunities ... for those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power.The Great Inflation of the 1970s was the next major U.S. economic dislocation. This problem was addressed in a 1977 amendment to the Federal Reserve Act, which provided the first explicit recognition of price stability as a national policy goal. The amended Act states that the Fed shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. The goals of stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates are related because nominal interest rates are boosted by a premium over real rates equal to expected future inflation. Thus, stable prices will typically produce long-term interest rates that are moderate.The objective of maximum employment remained intact from the 1946 Employment Act; however, the interpretation of this term may have changed during the intervening 30 years. Immediately after World War II, when conscription and price controls had produced a high-pressure economy with very low unemployment in the U.S., some perhaps believed that the goal of maximum employment could be taken in its mathematical sense to mean the highest possible level of employment. However, by the second half of the 1970s, it was well understood that some frictional unemployment, which involves the search for new jobs and the transition between occupations, is a necessary accompaniment to the proper functioning of the economy in the long run.This understanding went hand in hand in the latter half of the 1970s with a general acceptance of the Natural Rate Hypothesis, which implies that if policy were to try to keep employment above its long-run trend permanently or, equivalently, the unemployment rate below its natural rate, then inflation would be pushed higher and higher. Policy can temporarily reduce the unemployment rate below its natural rate or, equivalently, boost employment above its long-run trend. However, persistently attempting to maintain maximum employment that is above its long-run level would not be consistent with the goal of stable prices.Thus, in order for maximum employment and stable prices to be mutually consistent goals, maximum employment should be interpreted as meaning maximum sustainable employment, referred to also as full employment. Moreover, although the Fed has little if any influence on the long-run level of employment, it can attempt to smooth out short-run fluctuations. Accordingly, promoting full employment can be interpreted as a countercyclical monetary policy in which the Fed aims to smooth out the amplitude of the business cycle.This interpretation of the Fed's mandate was later confirmed in the Humphrey-Hawkins legislation. As its official title--the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978--clearly implies, this legislation mandates the federal government generally to ...promote full employment and production, increased real income, balanced growth, a balanced Federal budget, adequate productivity growth, proper attention to national priorities, achievement of an improved trade balance . . . and reasonable price stability... (italics added).Besides clarifying the general goal of full employment, the Humphrey-Hawkins Act also specified numerical definitions or targets. The Act specified two initial goals: an unemployment rate of 4% for full employment and a CPI inflation rate of 3% for price stability. These were only interim goals to be achieved by 1983 and followed by a further reduction in inflation to 0% by 1988; however, the disinflation policies during this period were not to impede the achievement of the full-employment goal. Thereafter, the timetable to achieve or maintain price stability and full employment was to be defined by each year's Economic Report of the President.The debate about the Fed's current mandateThe Fed then has two main legislated goals for monetary policy: promoting full employment and promoting stable prices. With this mandate, the Fed has helped foster the exceptional performance of the U.S. economy during the past decade. Still, some have argued that the Fed's mandate could be improved, especially in looking ahead to future attempts to maintain or institutionalize recent low inflation. Much discussion has centered on two topics: the transparency of the goals and their dual nature.The transparency of goals refers to the extent to which the objectives of monetary policy are clearly defined and can be easily and obviously understood by the public. The goal of full employment will never be very transparent because it is not directly observed but only estimated by economists with limited precision. For example, the 1997 Economic Report of the President (which has authority in this matter from the Humphrey-Hawkins Act) gives a range of 5 to 6% for the unemployment rate consistent with full employment, with a midpoint of 5.5%. Research suggests that there is a very wide range of uncertainty around any estimate of the natural rate, with one prominent study finding a 95% probability that it falls in the wide range of 4 to 7-1/2 % (see Walsh 1998).Price stability as a goal is also subject to some ambiguity. Recent economic analysis has uncovered systematic biases, say, on the order of 1 percentage point, in the CPI's measurement of inflation (see Motley 1997). In this case, actual price stability would be consistent with measured inflation of 1%. In addition, at any point in time, different price indexes register different rates of inflation. Over the past year, for example, the CPI has risen about 1-1/2%, while the GDP price index has risen about 1%. Still, a transparent price stability goal could be specified as a precise numerical growth rate (or range) for a particular index (which could take into account any biases). However, economists have also suggested other ways to enhance the transparency of policy. For example, publishing medium-term inflation forecasts might help to clarify the direction of policy (Rudebusch and Walsh 1998). Because the central bank has some control over inflation in the medium term, its forecasts would contain an indication of where it wanted inflation to go.A second recent proposed modification to the Fed's goals involves focusing to a larger extent on price stability and de-emphasizing business cycle stabilization. Some economists have argued that having dual goals will lead to an inflation bias despite the Fed's best attempts to control inflation. This argument stresses that the temptation to engineer gains in output in the short run will overcome the central bank's desire to control inflation in the long run. As a result of elevated inflation expectations of the public, inflation will end up being higher than the central bank intended, despite its best efforts. This time-inconsistency argument, as economists call it, coupled with the pain incurred in the 1970s as inflation skyrocketed and in the early 1980s as inflation was reduced to moderate levels, persuaded many that the primary goal of the central bank should be to stabilize prices.This view is embodied in the charter for the central bank in the new European Monetary Union: The primary objective of the European System of Central Banks is to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Community. Among these latter policies are a high level of employment and a balanced development of economic activities.Economists remain divided on the importance of the time inconsistency problem and on the need to put primary emphasis on price stability at the expense of output stabilization. Some stress the fact that the central bank is the only entity that can guarantee price stability, and that this goal is not likely to be attained for long unless price stability is designated as the primary goal. Others find the arguments for time inconsistency implausible because policymakers, who are aware of the arguments about an inflationary bias and see the implications for inflation, can conduct policy without an inflationary bias (McCallum 1995). Still others argue that the abdication of other goals is irresponsible (Fuhrer 1997). Also, a good deal of empirical research using simulations of models of the U.S. economy suggests that a focus on dual goals can reduce the variance of real GDP (i.e., smooth the business cycle) while achieving an inflation goal as well (Rudebusch and Svensson 1998).While these issues are not yet resolved, the experience of the past two decades provides some support to those who think dual goals that lack transparency can function successfully. It is true that some countries around the world have reduced inflation over this period while putting primary emphasis on explicit inflation targeting. But at the same time, with its current legislative mandate, the Fed also has had success in reducing inflation, while maintaining the flexibility of responding to business cycle conditions.John P. Judd Vice President and Associate Director of ResearchGlenn D. Rudebusch Research Officer ReferencesFuhrer, Jeffrey C. 1997. Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting: Monetary Policy Paradigms for the Next Millennium? New England Economic Review January/February, pp.20-36. Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Harcourt, Brace, and Company: New York.McCallum, Bennett. 1995. Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, vol. 85, no. 2 (May), pp. 207-211.Motley, Brian. 1997. Bias in the CPI: Roughly Wrong or Precisely Wrong. FRBSF Economic Letter 97-16 (May 23).Rudebusch, Glenn D., and Lars E.O. Svensson. 1998. Policy Rules for Inflation Targeting. NBER Working Paper 6512.Rudebusch Glenn D., and Carl E. Walsh. 1998. U.S. Inflation Targeting: Pro and Con. FRBSF Economic Letter 98-18 (May 29).Walsh, Carl E. 1998. The Natural Rate, NAIRU, and Monetary Policy. FRBSF Economic Letter 98-28 (September 18).